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NEXUS:

THE NEXT TEST OF

RICO's

TEXT

MELISSA HARRISON*

The United States Supreme Court will decide this term whether the
phrase "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of the enterprise's affairs" in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires proof that the defendant managed or
operated the enterprise.' The circuit courts of appeal disagree over the
meaning of "conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise."
The Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits require that one have actual participation in the management or operation of the enterprise
before RICO liability can attach,2 and the Supreme Court recently
3
granted certiorari in an Eighth Circuit case which applied the same test.
The other circuits have adopted various formulations, but all are4 less
restrictive than the manage or operate test. Reves v. Ernst & Young will
be the latest of numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted this important statute.
Although the authors of a leading RICO treatise have characterized
the meaning of "conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise"
as the "primary intellectual problem posed by the language of section
1962(c)," 5 the issue has received little scholarly attention. 6 The prob* Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1984. The author is a former Assistant United States Attorney and in that capacity
prosecuted RICO and other white collar crime cases.
I wish to thank Bari Burke, Dean Martin Burke, Steven Bahls, Larry Elison, Michael
Goldsmith, Donald J. Hall, Tom Huff and Nikki Kowalski, who reviewed drafts and gave
me useful comments and suggestions. I especially wish to thank G. Robert Blakey and
Carl Tobias, without whose assistance and knowledge this article would not have existed.
The errors and omissions which remain are mine. Charlotte Wilmerton provided invaluable technical assistance and CynthiaJones was a tireless research assistant. Finally, I thank
Peter Larson. This article is for him.
1. It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
2. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 n.10 (1982) aff'd en banc, 710 F.2d 1361,
1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132 (1989), rev'd en banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C.
denied, II S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
Cir. 1990), cert.
3. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsub nom.,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
4. Ild
5. DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO S-34-35 (1987).
6. There is only one student note solely on the issue of nexus. See Note, The RICO
Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible"Linkage, 83 MICH. L. REV. 571 (1984) [hereinafter Nexus Note].
The Smith and Reed treatise has a section on the subject, see supra note 5, at § 5.04. See also
Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darlingof the Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165,
228 (1980)(section on nexus).
Most recent RICO scholarships have involved the question of whether the pattern
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lem is commonly referred to as the "nexus" question. 7 This article will
ask and propose an answer to the question which the Supreme Court
will confront: What nexus or connection between the enterprise and the
pattern of racketeering activity is necessary? Employing the statutory
language, another way to frame the question is: What does it mean to
conduct or participate in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern
of racketeering activity?
This article will first demonstrate that the manage or operate test
adopted by the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits is too limiting.
Moreover, adoption of the manage or operate test would eviscerate the
requirement is vague. See G. Robert Blakey, Is "Pattern" Void for Vagueness?, 5 CIVIL RICO
REPORT 6, Dec. 12, 1989; G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God - Is This the
End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L..REv. 851 (1990) [hereinafter RICO Myths]; Michael Goldsmith,
RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971
(1988); Robert D. Luskin, Behold, the Day ofJudgment: Is the RICO PatternRequirement Voidfor
Vagueness?, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 779 (1990); Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO
Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691 (1990);Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy -Is
This the End of RICO?"-JusticeScalia Invites ConstitutionalVoid-for-Vagueness Challengeto RICO
"Pattern," 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990); David W. Gartenstein &Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO's "Pattern'"Requirement: Voidfor Vagueness?, 90 COLUM L. REV. 489 (1990).
Most of this scholarly commentary followed Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring opinion in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), intimating that the Court
might find the pattern component of RICO vague if squarely faced with the issue. Id. at
256. This has not yet happened.
Pattern of racketeering activity is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988), as requiring
"at least two acts of racketeering activity, [racketeering activity being defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 196 1(l) (1988)] one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last
of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
Scholars have also attended to the enterprise concept. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations(RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV.
291 (1983); Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 646 (1989).

Enterprise is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988), as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Issues which have arisen from the
enterprise concept include whether the enterprise must be distinct from the pattern,
whether the person and the enterprise must be distinct, and whether the enterprise can be
wholly illegitimate.
7. The word "nexus" has been used in other RICO contexts which are beyond the
scope of this article. This article does not attempt to discuss "nexus" as it relates to: 1)
the connection between the racketeering activity and organized crime, commonly referred
to as the "organized crime nexus" or 2) the connection between the racketeering acts and
interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) (requiring that the enterprise be engaged in, or that its activities affect, interstate commerce).
Nexus, as it is used in this article, has also been confused with the terms "employed by
or associated with" in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
This article is not about whether one is "employed by or associated with the enterprise." It is about whether one conducts or participates in the conduct of the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The confusion between these concepts is clearest when discussing whether outsiders can participate in the conduct of an enterprise. See,
e.g., United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055
(1987).
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RICO statute, especially in the criminal area. That test would permit
prosecutors to convict only actors at the highest level in a criminal organization and would exclude "foot soldiers" who carry out the directions of those above them in the hierarchy. Experience has shown that
"criminal actions far below the level of senior management can yield
significant profits to wrongdoers and thwart the attainment of the enterprise's legitimate goals." Congress aimed the statute at enterprise
criminality, not just the "big fish." 9
The manage or operate test would severely hamper both government prosecution of white collar crime and private civil actions to recover damages resulting from such crime. The need for both criminal
and civil RICO is compelling in the aftermath of the savings and loan
scandal and the collapse of the Bank of Commerce and Credit International. The manage or operate test would restrict those who could be
prosecuted to senior management in the enterprise itself and exclude
many who might have played significant roles in the fraudulent activity,
such as accountants, lawyers, and bankers, but who are outside the enterprise. Prosecutors' ability to use RICO to prosecute economic crime
would be sharply circumscribed.
Part I of this article provides a brief background of RICO. Part II
describes and criticizes the principal tests for nexus between the racketeering acts and the enterprise. Part II specifically analyzes Arthur Young
& Co. v. Reves, 10 the Eighth Circuit case in which the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari, and Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639,11 the District of Columbia Circuit Court case which
most thoroughly articulates the manage or operate test. Part III finds
that the manage or operate test has no support in RICO's text or legislative history. Part IV explores the detrimental implications of adopting
the manage or operate test. Part V analyzes RICO jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Part VI suggests that the Court apply traditional principles of statutory construction and reject the manage or operate test.
Part VI also proposes an ordinary meaning approach to nexus that
would better effectuate the purposes of the RICO statute.
PART

I.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF

RICO

RICO is one of the most controversial statutes that Congress ever
enacted. It was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.12 Use of RICO was infrequent until the mid-1970s. Controversy
8. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd en banc,
913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991) [hereinafterAmicus Curiae
Briejl.
9. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978) (cited in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 80 n.24 (1989)). See also
Bauerschmidt, supra note 6, at 1108.
10. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsubnon, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S.
Ct. 1159 (1992).
11. 883 F.2d 132.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
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began in the criminal arena when prosecutors applied the statute in actions against white collar criminals instead of solely to traditional "Mafia-type" organized crime. Civil RICO has engendered controversy ever
since it began to be used by the private bar in about 1975.13
The origins of RICO and its intended scope are a matter of dispute.
Gerard Lynch concludes that Congress intended RICO principally as a
tool for attacking the specific problem of infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. 14 G. Robert Blakey, RICO's principal drafter,
disagrees. He asserts that RICO was intended to deal with the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, but it was also intended
to encompass the much broader goal of dealing with all forms of "enterprise criminality." 15 Despite his views of RICO's origins, Lynch believes
that, over the years, judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of
RICO and that Congress approved this expansion when it reviewed
RICO in 1984 and did nothing to limit this broad judicial
6
interpretation. 1
For more than two decades, critics have vilified RICO, while proponents have showered it with praise. RICO's critics have characterized it
as "the Monster that mauled Wall Street"' 7 and "the Monster that Ate
Jurisprudence."'18 Its supporters have described it as "the single most
effective device for prosecuting systematic, organized criminal
activity."'9
Congress has steadfastly repelled vigorous attempts to repeal or
eviscerate RICO. The Supreme Court correspondingly has refused to
read the statute narrowly as its opponents have advocated. Nonetheless,
in the 1989 case of H.. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,20 Justice
Antonin Scalia, joined by three other justices, wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the statute was void for vagueness. 2 1 The defend13. See RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 857 (containing an excellent discussion of the
controversy surrounding RICO at page 857, n.14.)
14. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661, 662 (1987) (an influential article offering one of the most complete discussions
of RICO.)
15. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 866. See also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud
Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 254-80 (1982);
Michael Goldsmith, RICO and EnterpriseCriminality: A Response to GerardE. Lynch, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 774 (1988).
16. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical,and PoliticalGuide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 769, 773-74 (1990).
17. L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1050 (1990). Mr. Crovitz is an assistant editorial page editor at the Wall Street Journal.
18. David B. Sentelle, RICO: The Monster That Ate Jurisprudence,address at the CATO
Institute Seminar on RICO, Rights and the Constitution (Oct. 18, 1989) (copy available
from Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.), quoted in Paul Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and
Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990). Judge
Sentelle sits on the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
19. Coffey, supra note 18, at 1049. Mr. Coffey is Deputy Chiefofthe Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division of the Justice Department.
20. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
21. Id. at 251-56.
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ants in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 22 the Eighth Circuit case in which the
Court recently granted certiorari, urged that RICO be narrowly
28
construed.
PART

II.

THE CURRENT

NExus

TESTS

The circuit courts of appeals currently employ four primary tests for
nexus: The Scotto-Provenzano test, the Cauble test, the facilitation or utilization test and the manage or operate test.
Under the Scotto-Provenzano test, one conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when "(1) one is
enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position
in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
'24
enterprise.
Under the Cauble test, to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs, (1) a defendant must commit the racketeering acts, (2) the
defendant's position in the enterprise must facilitate the commission of
the racketeering acts and (3) the predicate acts must have some effect
25
directly or indirectly on the enterprise.
Under the facilitation or utilization test, there is a sufficient nexus
when there is "proof that the facilities and services of the enterprise
were regularly and repeatedly utilized to make possible the racketeering
activity .... -26
Under the manage or operate test, "[a] defendant's participation
must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participation in the operation or management of
the enterprise itself." 27 The phrase "[conduct or participate in the conduct of] refers to the guidance, management, direction, or other exercise of control over the course of the enterprise's activities." '2 8
A.

The Scotto-Provenzano Test

The defendant in United States v. Scotto 2 9 argued that the jury should
have been instructed that the predicate acts were "concerned or related
to the operation or management of the enterprise" or that they "af22. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112
S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
23. Id. at 1325.
24. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982).
25, United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984).
26. United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819
(1984).
27. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
28. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs k Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991).
29. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980).
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fected the affairs of the [enterprise] in its essential functions." 30 The
Second Circuit rejected this argument on appeal. The court stated "that
the statute does not distinguish between predicate acts which play a major or minor role."3 1 The court then articulated, without additional explanation, the following test: One conducts the activities of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity when "(1) one is
enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position
in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that
enterprise." '3 2 The Third Circuit adopted the Scotto standard in United
33
States v. Provenzano.
The Scotto-Provenzano test is overly broad in two ways. First, Scotto
states that if one is enabled solely by one's position within the enterprise
to commit the racketeering acts, one conducts the affairs of the enter35
prise.3 4 This test reaches activity beyond RICO's intended scope.
One's position could enable one to commit racketeering acts without
actually participating in the conduct of the enterprise. For example, in
United States v. Dennis,36 a General Motors employee collected usurious
loans from his co-workers at a General Motors plant. The indictment
charged that Dennis participated in the conduct of General Motors by
collecting these loans on the premises. The court in Dennis reached the
correct result when it dismissed the RICO count holding that merely
collecting loans on the premises did not constitute participation in the
conduct of General Motors. 3 7 If the Scotto-Provenzano test was applied in
Dennis, however, it could be argued that the defendant's position as a
General Motors employee enabled him to collect the usurious loans on
its premises.
Second, the Scotto court stated that the nexus is sufficient when the
offenses are related to the affairs of the enterprise.3 8 Being related to an
enterprise does not mean that one is conducting or participating in the
conduct of its affairs. Congress did not state in § 1962(c) that the com30. Id. at 54. In Scotto, Anthony Scotto, the President of an International Longshoremen's Union local, accepted payoffs from individuals representing waterfront employers
of ILA labor. The enterprise alleged in the indictment was the local union. Id. at 51.
31. Id. See also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976)).
32. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
33. 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). See also, Sun Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195 (9th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit articulated a very
similar test and cited, but did not explicitly adopt, Scotto. See United States v. Zang, 703
F.2d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983) (stating that "[t]o prove
a pattern, the Government must establish two or more predicate offenses which are related
to the activities of the enterprise.").
34. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
35. See Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 578; Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839
(1991).

36. 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
37. Id. at 199.
38. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
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mission of racketeering acts which are related to an enterprise is a crime.
Equating "related to" with "conduct or participate in the conduct of"
confuses nexus with pattern.3 9 The Supreme Court, in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,40 recently defined "pattern" as acts which are
related to each other or to some outside ongoing entity, such as the
enterprise, and are continuous or pose a threat of continuity. 4 1 If acts
are related either to each other or to the enterprise, they may form a
pattern. This does not mean that they were committed while participating in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs.
B.

The Cauble Test

In United States v. Cauble,4 2 the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
stating that merely working for a legitimate enterprise and committing
43
racketeering acts on the business premises do not establish nexus.
The court then cited, but reformulated, the Scotto test. The Cauble court
asserted that the Scotto test did not distinguish the enterprise-racketeering nexus from the defendant-racketeering connection4 4 and modified
the test as follows: To participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs, (1) a defendant must commit the racketeering acts, (2) the defendant's position in the enterprise must facilitate the commission of the
racketeering acts, and (3) the predicate acts must have some effect directly or indirectly on the enterprise. 4 5 The court explained the parameters of the test by stating that the effect on the enterprise could be
direct or indirect and the racketeering acts did not have to benefit or
advance the affairs of the enterprise. The government must simply
"prove that the racketeering acts affected the enterprise in some fash47
ion."'4 6 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have followed the Cauble test.
39. For the statutory definition of pattern, see supra note 6.
40. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
41. Id. at 239.
42. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). In Cauble, the
defendant, Rex Cauble, and a group of individuals known as the "Cowboy Mafia" ran a
drug smuggling operation. The enterprise named in the indictment was Cauble Enterprises, a business owned by Rex Cauble. The court found a sufficient nexus between the
drug smuggling venture and Cauble Enterprises based upon the following: (1) Cauble
Enterprises' airplane was used for drug smuggling travel, (2) Cauble Enterprises' assets
were used to pay for travel related to the drug smuggling, and (3) Cauble's position in
Cauble Enterprises made it possible for him to make available funds for loans and other
assets of the enterprise which the drug smugglers used. Id. at 1341.
43. Id. at 1332.
44. Id
45. Id. at 1333.
46. Id. at 1333, n.24.
47. United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ellison,
793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986). But see Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, aff'd, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). In Ellison, the
Eighth Circuit applied the Cauble test in a criminal case without even mentioning Bennett v.
Berg and the manage or operate test. In addition, the Sixth Circuit cited Cauble but did not
explicitly adopt the Cauble test in United States V. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Qaoud court stated, "to establish that an enterprise's affairs have been conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity, there must be a nexus between the enterprise
and the racketeering activity." Id. at 1115.
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The Cauble test is obviously more restrictive than Scotto, primarily
because its elements are phrased in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive. Moreover, the Cauble court used the term "effect" rather than
"related to." One problem with the Cauble test is that nexus is concerned with whether one participates in the conduct of the enterprise,
not whether there was an effect on the enterprise. One could participate
in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity and, for instance, affect another victim but not the enterprise
itself.

48

An additional difficulty with the Cauble test is its requirement that
one's position within the enterprise facilitate the commission of the acts.
Does this mean that outsiders cannot violate RICO? Many courts have
held that outsiders can violate the statute. 49 The text of RICO itself
states that the participation can be direct or indirect and provides that
the person need only be employed by, or associated with, the
enterprise. 50
48. See O'Neill, supra note 6, at 676. The author discusses the concept of enterprise as
"instrument", employing the example of United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985). In Blackwood, a Chicago police officer, was a court
sergeant in the Cook County Circuit Court. For more than a year he solicited and received
bribes from an FBI agent who was working undercover as part of Operation Greylord. In
return, Blackwood "influenced the disposition" of pending cases in the branch courts of
the Cook County Circuit Court. Blackwood was convicted under § 1962(c) for participating in the conduct of the Cook County Circuit Court's affairs through a pattern of bribery.
Thus, the enterprise played the role of instrument in the case. The Cook County Court
was not victimized by Blackwood's conduct, nor did it participate in the bribery, but Blackwood used his position in the court as leverage, as a "tool" through which to carry on his
bribery scheme.
49. The Justice Department amicus brief in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. uses the example of
"outsiders who assist the enterprise to commit crimes, use its resources for criminal purposes, or influence its actions by the payment of kickbacks to subordinates, surely 'participate . .. in the conduct' of its affairs through the prohibited pattern, even though not
significantly controlling its overall goals." Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 17. Courts
have consistently construed RICO to reach that behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Yonan,
800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987). In Yonan, a defense attorney in Chicago attempted to bribe an Assistant States Attorney to "fix" a criminal case.
Yonan, the defense attorney, was charged with conducting the affairs of the State's Attorney's office through a pattern of racketeering activity. The issue on appeal was whether
Yonan was associated with the States Attorney's office as required by the statute. The court
concluded that he was because he conducted business with the office. Id. at 168. However, even if Yonan was associated, it does not necessarily follow that he conducted the
affairs of the State's Attorneys office. The court in Yonan did not reach this issue, but it
seemed to treat the two elements as one.
Other examples of activity that would be excluded under the Cauble test are found in:
United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1390 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080
(1989) (lawyer who bribed judges participated in the conduct of the court's affairs); United
States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1987) (employee of subsidiary participated
in conduct of parent company by fraudulently procuring contracts for the subsidiary which
financially benefitted the parent company); United States v.Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226-27
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984) (city councilman participated in the conduct of a
law firm's affairs by accepting bribe to facilitate approval of transaction from which the law
firm stood to benefit); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475-76 (11th Cir.
1985) (defendants participated in the conduct of a motorcycle gang's affairs by engaging in
acts of extortion and drug dealing at behest of gang members).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
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The Facilitationor Utilization Test

The Eleventh Circuit espoused the facilitation or utilization test in
United States v. Carter.51 In Carter, the defendants had argued that the
illegal activity must affect the common everyday affairs of the enterprise. 5 2 The court rejected this limitation relying on an earlier Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Welch, which held that the enterprise must make
"possible the racketeering activity." 5 3 The Carter court found that since
"proof that the facilities and services of the enterprise were regularly
and repeatedly utilized to make possible the racketeering activity" a suf54
ficient nexus existed.
The Fourth Circuit followed this approach in United States v. Webster.55 In Webster 156 the court required that the racketeering activity
57
On rehearing, the Webster 1158
benefit the enterprise in some way.
panel rejected Webster I by finding sufficient racketeering activity based
on the government's proof indicating that the facilities of the enterprise
"were regularly made available to and put in the service of" the racketeering activity. 5 9
51. 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
In Carter, the defendants ran a marijuana importing business out of a dairy farm owned by
two of the defendants. The enterprise alleged in the indictment was the dairy farm. The
connections between the racketeering activity, the drug smuggling, and the dairy farm
were:
(1) a pasture located on the dairy farm was the site on which an airstrip was constructed and utilized for bringing in shipments of drugs; (2) the dairy farm office
was used for communication between conspirators concerning protection of the
drug smuggling activities from law enforcement authorities; (3) workers of the
dairy farm participated in the drug smuggling and protection activities; and (4) a
house on the dairy farm property was used for storing the drugs prior to
distribution.
Id. at 1525-26.
52. Id.at 1526.
53. 656 F.2d 1039, 1061 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Cashell v. United States, 456 U.S.
915 (1982).
54. Carter, 721 F.2d at 1527.
55. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 935 (1982). In Webster, the defendants ran a drug smuggling business. The enterprise alleged in the indictment was a restaurant owned by one of the defendants. Calls
regarding drugs were forwarded from the defendants' homes to the restaurant. Employees relayed narcotics related messages. An employee provided free drinks to a drug customer who was waiting at the restaurant for drugs to arrive so that a transaction could take
place. Id. at 187.
56. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 184.
58. 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 187 (quoting from Webster 1). At least one district court has applied Webster
when physical facilities of an enterprise were put to the use of a racketeer. In United
States v. Thomas, 749 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), the Sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee
was charged in a RICO indictment with various predicate acts including mail fraud, obstruction ofjustice and extortion. The enterprise was the Sheriff's Department. An issue
arose as to whether one of the predicate acts had a sufficiently close nexus to the enterprise. This act was an extortion scheme in which the Sheriff, an extremely influential local
politician, offered to influence a zoning decision in exchange for money. The defense
argued that this scheme was unrelated to the Sheriff's Department. The district court
rejected this argument and, following Webster II, held that the "Sheriff's Department was
...regularly made available to and put in the service of the alleged illegal activity." Id. at
849. This decision was based upon the following: (1) The Sheriff received phone calls
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The author of the Nexus Note proposed a similar test, considering
"the extent to which the defendant utilizes the organizationalstructure or
infrastructureof the alleged enterprise ... -60 According to the author,
"utilization requires that the enterprise be more than a context for criminal activity. To be 'utilized' the enterprise must be a 'weapon' of the
racketeer; it must enhance the ability to commit the crime." 6 1 Under
this test, one would look at various characteristics of utilization. 6 2 This
utilization test appears to be more narrow than that of Carter or Webster.
A problem with the utilization test, as espoused in Carterand Webster
11, is that the courts find utilization based solely on use of physical facilities. If utilization of physical facilities alone is sufficient under the test,
then Carterand Webster cannot be distinguished from United States v. Dennis. 63 Collecting loans on the premises of General Motors (Dennis) is
arguably no different from conducting drug deals at a restaurant (Webster) or smuggling drugs using a landing strip and the employees of a
dairy farm (Carter).
The problem with Carter, Webster, Thomas and Dennis may be that the
defendants did not conduct the affairs of those enterprises through a
pattern of racketeering activity. They simply utilized the facilities of the
enterprise. 64 In contrast, the author of the Nexus Note would require
more than use of physical facilities. 65 The author defines utilization to
require that the enterprise be used as a weapon. 6 6 This ignores many
about the matter at his office; (2) The Sheriff's secretary was instructed to set up a meeting regarding the matter; (3) Meetings regarding the matter regularly took place at the
Sheriff's office; (4) A co-defendant in the scheme was seen leaving the Sheriff's office with
the Sheriff and another Sheriff's Department employee; (5) A Sheriff's Department employee drove the codefendant to a meeting which the codefendant had with the victim of
the extortion; (6) The Sheriff used Sheriff's Department stationery to send letters regarding the matter. Id. at 848 n.2.
The author of this Article was one of the prosecutors of the Thomas case while an
Assistant United States Attorney.
60. Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 591 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. (footnote omitted).
62. Id. The other indicia mentioned by the author are:
(1) Whether the type of criminal activity in question requires or is generally associated with an enterprise ... ; (2) the defendant's position in the enterprise and
the extent to which it furthered the racketeering activity ... ; (3) the extent to
which the enterprise served to complicate detection...; (4) the scope and gravity
of the offenses; (5) use of physical facilities of the enterprise.
Id. at 591-95.
63. 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). See supra text accompanying note 36.
64. Professor Robert Blakey has suggested that all of these facilities, including the
General Motors plant in Dennis, are proper RICO enterprises if they serve as "fronts" for
the illegal activity. Telephone interview with G. Robert Blakey, William J. and Dorothy
O'Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Mar. 5, 1992).
Barry Tarlow has suggested that the restaurant in Webster was a "front" because it
was not a profit making operation. Tarlow argues that there should be little question that
the enterprise's affairs are connected to the racketeering when "the racketeering occurs on
enterprise property as a part of the plan under which the enterprise is merely a 'front' for
the racketeering." He argues that analyzing whether the enterprise is a "front" would be
more useful than determining utilization of facilities and employees. Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 6, at 375. Of course, the problem then becomes ascertaining whether the
enterprise is a front.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. Nexus Note, supra note 6, at 591.
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other roles which the enterprise might play, such as the enterprise as a
victim.

D.

67

The Manage or Operate Test
1. The Manage or Operate Test Before Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639

The Fourth Circuit was the first court to impose a manage or operate test. In United States v. Mandel,68 the government charged the defendants with conducting the affairs of an investment company through
a pattern of racketeering activity. A co-defendant transferred a partnership interest in the company to Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland in
exchange for his support of racing legislation. The Fourth Circuit held
that Mandel did not participate in the conduct of the enterprise because
Mandel acquired only a passive interest and did not manage or operate
the enterprise. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that
the "conduct or participate" language of § 1962(c) required some involvement in the management or operation of the enterprise. 69 One
might question whether Mandel remains valid after Webster 11.70 In Webster I, where the court required that the activity benefit the enterprise,
the court observed that "the Mandel panel opinion is not binding upon
us," presumably because the opinion had been vacated. 7 1 When the
Fourth Circuit applied Webster II, it rejected both the Mandel and Webster
I standards.
The Eighth Circuit, in Bennett v. Berg,72 was the second court to
adopt a manage or operate test. The Bennett court said in dicta that "[a]
defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the affairs of a RICO
enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participation in the opera73
tion or management of the enterprise itself."
67. See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 774 n.4, which states:. "The role of the enterprise
varies in each case depending upon its role in the underlying crimes. Often, the enterprise
is a perpetrator of illicit conduct. However, the enterprise may be a prize targeted for
takeover, a victim of racketeering activity, or an instrumentality facilitating the commission
of crimes."
See also O'Neill, supra note 6, at 675. O'Neill uses the case of Sun Say. & Loan v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987), as an example of the enterprise as victim.
Dierdorff was president of Sun Savings from 1980 to 1984. During that time, he solicited
and received kickbacks from of Sun's several larger customers. Using a fictitious name,
Dierdorff deposited upwards of $200,000 of kickback proceeds into his own account.
Through a series of phony letters, Dierdorff was able to conceal his activity from other Sun
officials for several years. He was fired upon exposure of the scheme. In its complaint,
Sun Savings alleged that Dierdorff violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting the affairs
of the savings and loan through a pattern of mail fraud thus benefitting himself to the
detriment of the company.
68. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, vacated on other grounds by an equally divided
court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) petitionfor rehearingdenied (en banc) 609
F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 959, 961 (1980).
69. Id. at 1375-76.
70. 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981). See discussion of Webster II, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 1981).
72. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
73. Id. at 1364. In Bennett, the plaintiffs were present and former residents of a retire-
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The Eighth Circuit cited Mandel for this proposition even though
the Fourth Circuit had already abandoned the manage or operate test in
Webster 1.74 Moreover, on remand the district court in Bennett v. Berg
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based on the fact that they had
not managed or operated the enterprise. The district court held that
"conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs could not be limited to operation or management."175
In a later criminal case, the Eighth Circuit adopted the Cauble standard and did not even mention Bennett v. Berg.7 6 Courts deciding later
civil RICO cases in the circuit have used the Bennett v. Berg manage or
operate test. The panel in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves commented on the
split in the circuits, but stated that it was bound to follow Eighth Circuit
precedent set by Bennett v. Berg.7 7 No other circuit court subscribed to
the manage or operate test from the time of the 1983 decision in Bennett
v. Berg until the 1990 en banc opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit
in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639.78
2.

The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.79 Case

Before Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., no other court had analyzed the nexus
tests and articulated the manage or operate test. Bennett v. Berg only
mentioned the manage or operate test in dicta80 but did not analyze it.
ment community. They brought suit against the not-for-profit corporation, Berg, the
founder of the retirement community, various other corporations founded by Berg, a life
insurance company, a mortgage lender to the community, the community's former accountants, two attorneys formerly employed by the various defendants, and certain officers
and directors of various defendant not-for-profit organizations. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants defrauded them so that plaintiffs faced the loss of the "life care" which they
expected to receive and for which they had paid. Id. at 1363.
74. Id See also supra text accompanying note 71.
75. The district court judge stated:
I am unpersuaded. I do not believe the words 'conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs' can reasonably be limited to
the sort of'hands-on-management' of daily activities which Prudential and SG&M
suggest. I find no case authority supporting such a proposition; and to require
that degree of involvement would both seem counter to the broad Congressional
directive that '[t]he provisions of RICO shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes,' . .. and incompatible with the express language of the
statute, which provides that such conduct or participation in the affairs of the
enterprise may be accomplished 'directly or indirectly.' Unfortunately, neither
the Eighth Circuit nor any other court which has focused separately on this language has undertaken to furnish any clear guidelines in the matter; but if this
wording must be viewed in isolation from the remainder of the statutory language
which follows, as the Eighth Circuit's en banc observation might seem to suggest,
it seems to me no more can logically be required than that the defendant be involved in activities which constitutes some meaningful aspect of the operation or
management of the affairs of the enterprise.
Bennett v. Berg, No. 80-0281-CV-W, 1984 WL 2756 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 1984) (quoting
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 947).
76. United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937
(1986).
77. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsub
nom, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
78. 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Bennett, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
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The D.C. Circuit's articulation of the test, thus, accorded importance to
the manage or operate test. Because Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. is the only case
to enunciate an underlying rationale for the test, this part of the Article
analyzes that rationale.
In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., a bus company sued a union for allegedly
committing racketeering acts in the course of engaging in a recognition
strike. The company alleged that the union participated in the conduct
of the affairs of the bus company through a pattern of racketeering activity. The panel in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. upheld the RICO complaint and
"decline[d] to adopt a more restrictive standard than that enunciated in
Cauble and Scotto. "'8 1 The panel opinion stated that "[s]ection 1962(c) of
RICO refers to direct as well as indirect participation in the enterprise's
affairs, and imposes no requirement that participation be at the management level or relate to 'core functions'."' 2
The District of Columbia Circuit Court reversed the panel.8 3 The
en banc court framed the issue as "[d]oes a union merely by conducting
a recognition strike against an employer 'conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly in the conduct of' the employer's affairs within the meaning
of 1962(c)?" 8 4 The court held that it did not and adopted a management or operation test which is even narrower than that prescribed in
Bennett v. Berg.
The court first discussed some of the nexus tests. It rejected the
Scotto-Provenzano test as "far too lenient," because "[i]f section 1962(c)
can apply whenever predicate offenses are merely related to the activities
of an enterprise, then the 'participation in the conduct' element of that
section practically drops out." 85 Next it discussed, but did not criticize,
the Cauble test, 86 and did not mention the Carter utilization test. The
court then stated that it was adopting the Bennett operation and manage87
ment test.
The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court observed that RICO does not proscribe mere participation in the affairs of an enterprise, but rather participation in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs. 88 It then stated that
"conduct" is synonymous with "management" or "direction" according
to Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 8 9
The 'conduct of [the enterprise's] affairs' thus connotes more
than just some relationship to the enterprise's activity; the
phrase refers to the gifidance, management, direction or other
exercise of control over the course of the enterprise's activities.
81. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883
F.2d 132, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'den banc, 913 F2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 949.
85. Id. at 952 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 953.
87. Id. at 954.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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In order to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs,
then, a person must participate, to some extent, in 'running the
show.' 90
The court asserted that this interpretation was faithful to RICO's goals
because RICO's purpose is to eliminate "the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." 9 1 Since the union did not conduct or participate in
control over the
the conduct of the bus line's affairs, it did not exercise
92
management or operation of the bus company.
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. created a more stringent test than
the one articulated in Bennett because one must exercise "control over
the management or operation of the enterprise."'9 3 Under Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc., one not only has to participate in the management or operation of the enterprise but also have "control over the management or
' '9 4
operation.
95
3. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves

The Supreme Court has chosen to resolve the nexus issue with Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves. This was a class action suit by shareholders in
the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. and other
owners of demand notes issued by the co-op. The co-op had a board of
directors comprised of farmers who were shareholders and a general
the co-op. The comanager appointed by the board actually managed
96
notes.
promissory
selling
by
money
raised
op
Beginning in 1980, the general manager of the co-op, Jack White,
obtained loans from the co-op to finance the continued construction and
operating costs of a gasohol plant in which he had a substantial investment. White participated in certain activities with the co-op, which led
to the co-op's ownership of that gasohol plant and White's being relieved of over $4 million of debt to the co-op. 97 In early 1981, White
was convicted of tax fraud in a scheme which included allegations that
he engaged in a course of self-dealing with the co-op and manipulated
the co-op's finances to serve his own personal ends. 9 8
After his conviction, but while he was out on bond awaiting the outcome of his appeal, White hired the firm of Arthur Young and Company
to serve as the co-op's accountants. 99 Over a period of years, Arthur
Young and Company's accountants used accounting practices that re90.

Id.
91. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), reprinted in 1970
U.S.S.C.A.N. 4007).
92. Id. at 956.
93. Id. at 954.
94. Id.
95. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. grantedsub
nom, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1316.
98. Id. at 1316 n.3.
99. Id. at 1316 n.4.
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sulted in the overvaluation of the gasohol plant and projected a false
financial picture of the co-op. 100 When the gasohol plant ultimately
became insolvent, the co-op's true financial position was revealed and
the co-op was forced into bankruptcy. 10 1
The plaintiffs primarily alleged that Arthur Young and Company
induced buyers to purchase demand notes through the concealment of
the co-op's financial position in violation of both federal and state securities laws. They also alleged that Arthur Young and Company was a
material participant in the operation and management of the co-op in
violation of RICO. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants and dismissed the RICO claim. At trial of the remaining
issues, the jury found that Arthur Young and Company committed both
state and federal securities fraud.102
Before the Eighth Circuit, the class argued that the district court
had improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young
and Company on its RICO claim. 10 3 The panel relied on Bennett v. Berg
and applied the manage or operate test to conclude that:
Arthur Young's involvement with the Co-op was limited to the
audits, meetings with the Board of Directors to explain the audits, and presentations at the annual meetings. In the course of
this involvement it is clear that Arthur Young committed a
number of reprehensible acts, but these acts in no way rise to
the level of participation in the management or operation of
the Co-op. 104
The class urged the Eighth Circuit to follow the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Touche Ross &
Co. 10 5 In that case, the court had stated that "[i]t is not necessary that a
RICO defendant participate in the management or operation of the enterprise."' 1 6 Acknowledging the split in the circuit courts on this issue
and citing Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., the court in Arthur Young & Co. concluded
en banc
that "until the Supreme Court rejects our standard or this1 0court
7
overrules Bennett, we are bound to follow that decision."
100. Id. at 1316-20. The accountants knew that if the plant were to be valued at less
than 1.5 million dollars, the co-op's net worth would be eliminated, thus provoking a run
on the demand notes and depriving the co-op of its primary source of funds.
101. Id. at 1320-21.
102. Id at 1321-22.
103. Id. at 1323.
104. Id. at 1324.
105. 782 F.2d 966 (l1th Cir. 1986). In Touche Ross, five banks which provided financing
for a bankrupt corporation sued the accountants who prepared the financial statements of
the corporation. The district court dismissed the RICO claim and the Eleventh Circuit
reinstated it. The circuit court stated that the "statute requires only that the defendant
'participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs'...." The
circuit court further stated: "The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to
insiders and outsiders - those merely 'associated with' an enterprise - who participate
directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
..
. The RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally
involved." Id. (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978) (emphasis in original)).
106. 782 F.2d at 970.
107. Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324.
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGE OR OPERATE TEST

The traditional sources of statutory interpretation are text, structure, purpose, congressional intent and legislative history. 10 8 The
Supreme Court has traditionally seen itself as an agent of the legislature,
responsible for implementing the original intent or purpose of the enacting Congress. According to this view, the judicial task is to ascertain
and apply judgments of the legislature. 10 9 When the Court undertakes
traditional analysis, "legislative history is usually relevant, either to supply the meaning for an ambiguous statute or to confirm or rebut the
plain meaning of a clear statute." 1 10 This part of the Article analyzes
the traditional sources of statutory interpretation-language, structure,
and history-and finds no basis in the statute for the manage or operate
test.
Neither the Arthur Young & Co."i court nor the court in Bennett v.
Berg, 1 2 upon which the Arthur Young & Co. court relied, articulated a
rationale for the manage or operate test. The District of Columbia Circuit Court is the only court to have done so.'" 3 This Article will, therefore, criticize the test as enunciated in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.
A.

The Test is Textually Incorrect.

"Textual analysis starts with the specific words of the statutory provision being interpreted. The interpreter should appoach the statutory
reader would and give the text its most
text as a reasonably intelligent
' 14
commonsensical reading."
1. The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. definition of terms is too narrow.
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. construed the word "conduct" in
the statute to be synonymous with the words "management" or "direction," citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 1 15 Because
it found the words synonymous, the District of Columbia's circuit court
concluded that the conduct of the enterprise's affairs "refers to the guidance, management, direction or other exercise of control over the
course of the enterprise's activities," and equated this with "running the
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
411 (1989). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutoy Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 20 (1988); Nicholas S. Zeppos,Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. LJ.
353 (1989).
109. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 415. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (1990).
110. Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626; see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,
604 (1986).
111. 937 F.2d 1310.
112. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
113. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
114. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354-55 (1990); see also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
115. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 954.
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show." 1

16

The court's definition is flawed for two reasons. First, it incorrectly
limits the possible definitions to manage and direct. The Oxford English Dictionary includes the meaning, "[t]o direct, manage, carry on (a
transaction, process, business, institution, legal case, etc.)," but adds:
"[t]he notion of direction or leadership is often obscured or lost; e.g. an
investigation is conducted by all those who take part in it.' 1 17 Webster's
Dictionary of Synonyms states:
conduct may imply the act of an agent who is both the leader
and the person responsible for the acts and achievements of a
group having a common end or goal.., but often the idea of
leadership is lost or obscured, and the stress is placed on a carrying on by all or by many of the participants ....
I18
Finally, Black's Law Dictionary defines the verb conduct as "[t]o manage; direct; lead; have direction; carry on; regulate; do business." '1 19
The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. decision ignores the equally, if not more,
valid connotation of the word conduct as "carrying on." That Congress
intended this is reinforced because the statute says "conduct or participate ... [in] the conduct of an enterprise," 120 not merely "conduct an
enterprise."
This raises the second problem with the court's definitional interpretation. It ignores the "participate in the conduct of" language. Why
did Congress add the "participate in the conduct" 12 1 language and what
does it mean? This language bolsters the idea of "carrying on by all or
by many of the participants."' 2 2 Webster's Third New International
Dictionary defines participate as "to take part in something ... in common with others."' 123 In Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, the synonyms for participate are share and partake.' 24 Black's Law Dictionary
defines participate as:
To receive or have a part or share of; to partake of; experience
in common with others; to have or enjoy a part or share in common with others. To partake, as to 'participate' in a discussion,
or in a pension or profit sharing plan. To take equal shares and
proportions; to share or divide, as to participate in an estate.
125
To take as tenants in common.
This language reinforces the notion that Congress intended these terms
to mean a "common undertaking," or in other words, "to take part in
carrying on the business in common with others," not merely to manage
or operate.
116. Id.
117. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis in original).

118.

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 184 (1942) (emphasis added).

119. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 295 (6th ed. 1990).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
121. Id
122. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (2d ed. 1989).
123. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1646

124. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 607 (1942).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1118 (6th ed. 1990).

(1986).
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The court's interpretation of the statute also excludes the words
"directly or indirectly" which appear in all three subsections of
§ 1962.126 One cannot control the operation of an enterprise or "run
27
the show" indirectly, nor can one indirectly direct, guide or manage.'
Yet, that is what Congress expressly stated in all three subsections of
§ 1962. The use of the words "directly or indirectly" additionally demonstrates that Congress did not intend a manage or operate limitation in
the statute.
In short, "conduct and participate" are words of ordinary meaning.
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. illustrates what Professor Gerard E. Lynch refers to,
in a closely related context as "twist[ing] a rather basic... concept into
elaborate knots in order to find.., lack of pattern in civil [RICO] suits
1 28
to which the courts are hostile."
2.

The structure of RICO does not support the manage or
operate test.

In Russello v. United States, 129 the United States Supreme Court concluded that "[C]ongress selected th[e] general term, [interest], apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute
in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth."' 3 0 Other terms of breadth
that the Russello3 1Court referred to were "enterprise," "racketeering" and
"participate."'
"Conduct"' 3 2 is also a term of breadth. When Congress placed the two words, conduct and participate together, as it did in
§ 1962(c), Congress must have intended the terms to be construed
broadly. Similarly, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 33 the Court declared
that "RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson ... of Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach.... 134
Moreover, Congress inserted more restrictive language in other
parts of the statute, thus indicating that it intentionally employed broad
language in § 1962(c). Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful to use or invest income derived from racketeering activity "in acquisition of any in126. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). § 1962(a) makes it "unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income.... in acquisition... of any enterprise." See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)
(1988) (it is unlawful to acquire or maintain, "directly or indirectly," any interest in, or
control over, an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity). Id. § 1962(c) states
that "[iut shall be unlawful ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."
127. The Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court said that its construction of the statute allows for
indirect as well as direct participation, but the court failed to explain how one could control an enterprise indirectly. 913 F.2d at 954.
128. Lynch, supra note 14 at 772 n.8.
129. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
130. Id. at 21.
131. Id. at 21-22. The terms appear in the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)
(1988) (enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c) (1988) (racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988)
(participate).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
133. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
134. Id. at 497-98.
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terest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise....
This section also states that a "purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling
or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do
so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection .... "1

36

Congress obvi-

3 7
ously knew that use of "control or participate ... in the control of"'
38
was more restrictive than "conduct or participate in the conduct of."'
If Congress had wished to impose the same limitation on § 1962(c), it
could have done so.13 9 "When Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another... [the Court] generally presume[s] that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
40
disparate inclusion or exclusion."'
The word "control" is also included in § 1962(b), which states that
it is unlawful to "acquire or maintain directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise . . . through a pattern of racketeering
activity."' 14 1 Congress presumably knew what it was doing when it included narrow terms in one part of the statute and more general terms
in another. If Congress had intended for manage or control to be a part
of § 1962(c), it could have added the term because it did so in
14 2
§§ 1962(a) and (b).

3.

Consideration of the use of the same term in other provisions
of the same enactment does not support the manage or
operate test.

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1955, like RICO, as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.14 3 Section 1955(a) provides:
"Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all
or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 144 This language raises two issues. First, why did Congress include conducts, manage and supervise in § 1955 and only conduct in § 1962(c)? It cannot
possibly mean, as the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. court states, that conduct
means only manage or direct. If conduct means only manage or direct,
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
136. l
137. L
138. Id § 1962(c).
139. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489; Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981).
140. Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722
(5th Cir. 1972)). See also HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
142. In 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute), Congress intended only to reach managers and it specifically indicated so by stating "a person is engaged in continuing criminal enterprise if . . . such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management"; see, e.g., Garrett
v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985) ("This language is designed to reach the 'top
brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers.").
143. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).
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Congress would not have needed to add those words to the statute in
§ 1955. According to that interpretation, the word conduct would have
been sufficient.
Common sense and common usage suggest that conduct be construed as the more general term and manage, supervise and direct as
more specific terms within the general meaning of conduct. This is also
consistent with the dictionary definition. Moreover, Congress was apparently aware of the meaning of the words manage, direct and supervise as it added them to § 1955, which is included as part of the same
Act. One must assume that Congress would have employed manage,
operate or direct in § 1962(c) if it had intended to so narrow the reach
of that provision. The Supreme Court has said that it should not lightly
infer that Congress intended a term to have wholly different meanings in
"neighboring" provisions passed simultaneously.1 4 5
Second, how have courts interpreted § 1955? If conduct is synonymous with manage and direct as the court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. suggests, courts should find that conduct is superfluous in § 1955 and that
the provision requires one to manage or direct the gambling operation.
That has not happened. In fact, no court has imposed such a requirement. The United States Supreme Court, in dicta, stated that "18
U.S.C. § 1955 (1976 ed.) proscribes any degree of participation in an
illegal gambling business, except participation as a mere bettor."' 14 6 In
United States v. Zannino,1 47 the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[t]he term 'conduct' embraces all who participate in the operation of the specified gambling business, that is, each and every
person who performs any act, function, or duty necessary or
helpful in the business' ordinary operation. As we read it, the
statute of conviction applies even to individuals who have no
role in managing or48controlling the business and who do not
share in its profits.'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Greco, 14 9 observed that "[t]he word 'conduct' is broad in scope... [A] person may
be found to conduct a gambling business even though he is a mere servant or employee having no part in the management or control of the
business.. . ."150 In short, the construction of § 1955 has generated
little controversy.' 5 ' All courts agree that the term conduct is broader
than the terms manage or direct.
B.

RICO's Legislative History Does Not Support the Manage or Operate Test
The court in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. justified its narrow reading of the

145. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985).
146. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70-71 n.26 (1978).
147. 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 10.
149. 619 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Rotchford, 575 F.2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1978)).
151. See generally G. Robert Blakey and Harold Kurland, The Development of the Federal
Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 923 (1978).
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statute by invoking the statute's goals and quoting a section of legislative history out of context. The court quoted *theSenate Report for the
proposition that "[t]he purpose of RICO is to eliminate 'the infiltration
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.'. .. [It] was passed in order to attack 'the
use of force, threats of force, enforcement of illegal debts, and corruption in the acquisition or operation of business."'

52

This portion of the legis-

lative history, however, explains the need for civil remedies; it was not
commenting on the intended coverage of § 1962(c). In fact, the legislative history supports no such narrow purpose of the statute, but clearly
states that § 1962(c) has a broad scope:
Unlike subsection (a), which provides an exception to the prohibition against investing funds derived from racketeering activity into an enterprise 'where there is no resulting control in
law or in fact to the investor,' subsection (c) applies to any 'conduct of the enterprise through the prohibited
pattern'; 'there is
53
no limitation on the prohibition."
Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that RICO can
only reach the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations in United States v. Turkette,154 thus rejecting the limitation on the statute's purpose which the District of Columbia Circuit
Court imposed. The defendant in Turkette argued that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration
by racketeers and could not reach wholly illegitimate enterprises which
performed only illegal acts and which did not attempt to infiltrate legiti55
mate business.'
The Court rejected this limitation on RICO. First, it found that
nothing in the text of the statute supported such a restriction. The
Court also stated that the legislative history's support of the view that
RICO's major purpose was to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime does not support a negative inference that the
56
statute cannot reach others.'
The Supreme Court, in Russello v. United States, 157 observed that
RICO's legislative history evinces a broad Congressional intent. The
Court emphasized the sweeping language of the legislative history,
which states that the intent of RICO was to "provide new weapons of
unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots."1 5 8 The Court stated:
152. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 954 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Sess. 76, 81
(1969), reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
153. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 8, at 17 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 159 (1969)) (reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 4007) (emphasis in original).
154. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). But see HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (prologue of the statute describes a relatively narrow

focus upon organized crime).
155. Turhette, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
156. Id. at 591.

157. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
158. Id. at 26 (1983).
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What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not
only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be
made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack
must take place on all available fronts.159
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Court refused to
read an organized crime limitation into the statute 160 and stated that
such a limitation finds no support in the text and contravenes the tenor
of the legislative history. The opinion continues by stating that the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intentionally adopted "com16 1
modious language capable of extending beyond organized crime."
The Court again invoked the legislative history for the idea that "[t]he
occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was
not limited in application to organized crime." 1 62 The Court quoted
the legislative history: "It is impossible to draw an effective statute
which reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet
does not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." 16 3 In sum, the legislative history does not support the narrow interpretation of the statute's terms by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court.
Some language in the legislative history of analogous provisions of
the same act supports the conclusion that Congress intended the word
"conduct" to be construed broadly. 18 U.S.C. § 1511,164 includes the
same conduct, manage, direct, or supervise language as does § 1955.165
The House Report on § 1511 states that Congress intended the statute
to reach both "high level bosses and street level employees."'1 6 6 This
language suggests that the word conduct was meant to reach "street
level employees" as well as "high level bosses." It certainly lends no
support to, and directly contravenes, a construction of the word "conduct" which would limit it to manage, operate or direct.
159. Id. at 27 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969), reprintedin 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
160. 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring).
161. Id. at 246.
162. Id. at 248.
163. Id. (quoting Senator McClellan, the bill's principal sponsor).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988) states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the
intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if...
(3) one or more of such persons conducts[,] finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.
165. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
166. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 553 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4029.
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IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MANAGE OR OPERATE TEST

Adoption of the "manage or operate" test would eviscerate the
RICO statute. If the Supreme Court were to adopt the manage or operate test, it would have severe consequences for prosecutors of criminal
RICO cases and plaintiffs pursuing civil RICO.
A.

The Implicationsfor CriminalRICO

Under the manage or operate test, the Justice Department could
only prosecute persons in charge of enterprises. Consider, for example,
the "Club" case in the Southern District of New York.1 6 7 The Justice
Department prosecuted members of organized crime and their associates for racketeering acts involving, as the enterprise, the Genovese
crime family. Leaders of the family, the "foot soldiers" in the family and
even some nonfamily associates were prosecuted for their participation
in carrying out the business of the Genovese family. Under the manage
or operate test, only the heads of the family could be prosecuted. The
manage or operate test would exclude enforcers and others who carry
out the directives of those above them in the hierarchy.
An example in the public corruption context is the RICO prosecution of the sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee. 168 In this case, there were
seven RICO defendants, including the sheriff and several of his deputies. They all participated in the racketeering activity, but not all had
management positions within the Sheriff's Department, the enterprise
named in the indictment. In fact, some of the deputies were employees,
who were intimately involved in the racketeering activity but not highly
placed in the Sheriff's Department. Application of the manage or operate test means that only the sheriff could have been prosecuted for these
crimes. Such a result would be incompatible with the goal of RICO,
which is to pursue enterprise criminality in all its forms. 1 69 As the Justice Department propounded in its amicus brief in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.,
senior management can yield significant profits to wrongdoers and
thwart the attainment of the enterprise's legitimate goals. 170 No court,
since the Fourth Circuit in Mandel,17 1 has applied the "manage or operate" test in a criminal context. In fact, the Eighth Circuit, the circuit that
first articulated the manage or operate test in a civil RICO case, employed a different standard, the Cauble standard, 17 2 in a later criminal

case. 173
167. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 931
(1992).
168. United States v. Thomas, 749 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
169. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984) (quoting Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6, at 1013-14).
170. Amicus CuriaeBrief, supra note 8, at 17.
171. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, vacated on other grounds by an equally divided
court, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) petitionfor rehearing,denied (en banc),
609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 959, 961 (1980).
172. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
173. United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937
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In Arthur Young & Co., 174 the United States Supreme Court must
decide the meaning of nexus as applied to a civil case. Its decision, however, will govern the interpretation of the term in the criminal context as
well. Courts have imposed many of the limitations on RICO in the civil
context. Moreover, many observers believe that there is more judicial
hostility to civil RICO than to criminal RICO. 175 The Justice Department uses civil RICO far less often than criminal RICO. It has stringent
guidelines for invoking criminal RICO, which operate as a kind of
"watchdog" against abuses of criminal RICO.1 7 6 That watchdog provision does not exist in civil RICO. 17 7 The Department of justice's concern is that the Supreme Court will interpret RICO in ways which would
178
detrimentally affect both criminal and civil RICO.
The statute's text and legislative history offer no basis for treating
any of its terms differently in civil RICO than in criminal RICO and,
thus, interpretations of provisions of the statute apply to both criminal
(1986). But see, Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (D.C. Circuit followed Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. in a subsequent civil case).
174. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112
S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
175. See, e.g., Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil
RICO Cases Does Not Work." It's Time For Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1990):
My RICO perspective comes from my years as a federal district court judge in
Chicago ....
As I dealt with these cases, it became clear to me that most civil
RICO cases simply should not be in federal court. The majority of civil RICO
cases involve commonplace commercial controversies, the facts of which reveal
an ordinary business relationship gone sour.
l at 674. "RICO has also come under fire recently from judges in and out of the courtroom. ChiefJustice Rehnquist was reportedly concerned about the number of RICO cases
on the federal docket." Coffey, supra note 18, at 1037.
176. See Coffey, supra note 18 at 1043; Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of
the Department ofJustice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 654 (1990).
177. H.R. REP. No. 1717, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), introduced by Rep. WilliamJ.
Hughes of New Jersey and currently pending in the House of Representatives, includes a
judicial gatekeeper provision:
(3) The court shall dismiss a claim against a defendant under this subsection if, at
any time before trial, upon motion of the defendant or on the court's own motion, the court determines after a hearing that the claim finds to meet the requirements of the final 3 sentences of paragraph (1) of this subsection, or the plaintiff
has failed to show that this extraordinary civil remedy is in the public interest and
is needed to deter egregious criminal conduct, considering any need to deter the
defendant and others similarly situated.
Id.; See also Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper
Concept, 43 VAND. L. REv. 735 (1990) (reviewing various gatekeeper proposals). Goldsmith
and Linderman suggest standards for a gatekeeper provision, proposing the following
statutory language:
In determining whether to permit a civil RICO claim to proceed, the court must
find that the allegations concern long-term criminal activity, or the threat thereof,
which pose a serious threat to society. Factors to consider in this respect include:
(i) the duration of the criminal activity and the degree to which each predicate act inflicted independent injury;
(ii) the extent of economic loss and the number of victims;
(iii) whether the defendant held a position of special trust or committed
crimes against especially vulnerable victims; and
(iv) whether the allegations concern merely an ordinary commercial dispute.
The decision of the court must be accompanied by a statement of reasons reflecting the application of these factors.
Id. at 766.
178. Dennis, supra note 176, at 656.
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and civil RICO. A court must remember that when it decides a case in a
civil RICO context, the ruling has important implications for criminal

RICO as well. Adoption of the manage or operate nexus test would
undermine criminal RICO.
B.

The Manage or Operate Test Would Severely FrustrateEfforts in the
Criminal and Civil Arenas to Combat "Economic Crime."
If the United States Supreme Court adopts the manage or operate

test, who would be excluded? In Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves 179 the accountants would be excluded. The "hue and cry" over RICO started
when it was applied in the white collar context. There has been little

complaint about 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The same language has been construed for years to include everyone affiliated with the gambling business, even cocktail waitresses who serve the gamblers drinks.18 0 The
controversy over RICO has focused almost entirely on its application to
white collar crime and to persons who are involved in white collar
crime. 181
The economic crime problem in this country has reached epidemic
proportions.' 82 The savings and loan scandal, particularly the collapse
of the Charles Keating empire, exemplifies the magnitude of the problem. At least one-half of bank failures and one-quarter of thrift failures
involve criminal activity by insiders. 18 3 In the savings and loan crisis,
the government is bringing criminal RICO suits and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) are using civil RICO.1 84 The enormity of the economic crime
problem is further evidenced by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), the consequences of which remain unknown. Federal prosecutors and private parties have already filed RICO
18 5
suits based on the collapse of BCCI.
179. 937 F.2d 1310.
180. See United States v. Tucker, 638 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833

(1981).
181. See Crovitz, supra note 17. Mr. Crovitz, an editor of the Wall Street Journal is well
known for his opposition to RICO's use against Wall Street. See also G. Robert Blakey et
al., What's Next?: The Future of RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (1990) (a debate between Mr. Crovitz and Professor Blakey, RICO's principal drafter).
182. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 882-86; see also, Note, InsiderAbuse and CriminalMisconduct in FinancialInstitutions: A Crisis?Renae v. Stevens, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222 (1989).
183. H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13 (1988), cited in Brief of Trial Lawyers for PublicJustice as Amicus Curiae, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S.Ct. 1159 (1992).
184. RICO Myths, supra note 6, at 885.
185. Federal prosecutors indicted BCCI, as a corporation, on RICO charges in district
court in the District of Columbia. A plea agreement has been reached in the case in which
all BCCI assets in the United States are to be forfeited. Half of the forfeited assets will be
sent to an overseas fund to repay creditors and half will be distributed here to government
entities and to victims. See United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., DC, Crim.
No. 91-0655 (JHG), plea approved Jan. 1, 1992 (reported in FederalJudge Approves BCCI
Settlement Over Objections of Other BCCI Creditors, 17 BNA, Daily Report for Executives A-8,
Jan. 27, 1992). The plea agreement does not preclude the government from prosecuting
individuals who may have been involved in the scandal. A civil RICO class action suit
arising out of the BCCI collapse has been filed in Los Angeles. Among the defendants are
the accounting firms of Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young. See Victoria Slind-Flor,
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Some observers have tried to frame the issue as one of whether
RICO was intended to reach those who are peripherally involved in the
enterprise.' 8 6 They characterize accountants, lawyers and investment
bankers as only peripherally involved when the enterprise is the company or organization that hired them.' 8 7 This characterization is false.
Professionals have played key roles in many of the savings and loan failures.18 8 Accountants, lawyers or bankers may be so involved in shaping
the course of the business of the enterprise that they are conducting or
participating in its conduct. Attorneys may shape the activities of their
clients through the rendering of legal advice, accountants through their
accounting services, and lenders through their financing.' 89
An accountant, lawyer or banker will rarely manage or control the
enterprise as the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. test' 90 would require. In fact, that
test would include only the top management of the enterprise. Congress intended RICO to reach anyone who conducts or participates in
the conduct of the enterprise. This may or may not include accountants,
lawyers or bankers depending on the circumstances of the case. If RICO
includes "Mafia" foot soldiers who carry out a mob murder at the behest
of the "family boss," then it includes an accountant who, by preparing
false statements or by otherwise misrepresenting the financial status of a
company at the behest of the chief executive officer, conducts or participates in the conduct of the company.
Three accounting firms are implicated in the Charles Keating scandal.' 9 1 Accounting groups have been very active in seeking to restrict
BCCI Suit: Far-Flung, Massive, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 20, 1992, at 1. In addition, the Banking
Department of the State of New York, filed a civil RICO suit seeking recovery of loans
from the New York agency of BCCI. See Zephas v. Zurich Corp., 91 Civ. 7907 (JSM), D.C.
S.N.Y., Nov. 22, 1991 (reported in N. Y. Banking Department Seeks Recovery of Loansfrom BCCI
in Receivership Case, 231 BNA, Daily Report for Executives A-2, Dec. 2, 1991).
186. See Edward Brodsky, RICO-Conflicting Views about Professionals, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 11,
1991, at 3 (discussing the Arthur Young & Co. case).
187. Id.
188. Two Firms Settle Lincoln S&L Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al (Ernst & Young
and Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue settle lawsuits arising out of failure of Lincoln Savings
and Loan); Donna K. H. Walters, New Liability Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants Scunying, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at D1; Yes-Men Professionals, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 16,

1992, at 20 (editorial) ("[S]urrounding Keating like a praetorian guard were phalanxes of
lawyers and accountants who assured both investors and regulators that their client's Lincoln Savings and Loan was sound.");James S. Granelli, Keating'sAdvisers Under Fire: Attorneys, Accountants Helped Massive FraudWork Investors' Lawyers Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992,
at Dl.
189. See Stephen Labaton, Law Firm Will Pay A $41 Million Fine in Savings Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992, at Al. (On March 2, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision filed a
RICO civil suit against the New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handle
for its role in the collapse of Charles Keatings' Lincoln Savings Bank. On March 9, 1992,
the firm agreed to pay forty-one million dollars to settle the lawsuit); see alsoJolie Solomon,
U.S. Did In S&L Advisor By the Book, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 35 (stating the

public should be delighted that the government cracked down on Kaye and Scholer).
190. See supra notes 79-94, and accompanying text.
191. One of those implicated is Arthur Young & Co. (now Ernst & Young). See Allison
Leigh Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S & L Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1992, at AI (Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Ernst & Young settle Keating litigation). See
also Eric N. Berg, Losing $2 Billion-An Accounting Quagmire; The Lapses by Lincoln's Auditors,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1989, at Dl. Arthur Young & Co. gave Lincoln and American Conti-
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the scope of RICO.19 2 The efforts of the accounting profession to limit
its liability under RICO should be considered in light of the role which
accountants have played in the collapse of the savings and loan institutions. There are compelling reasons to construe "conduct" to include
these white collar offenders in the reach of RICO.
PART

V.

AN ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT

RICO JURISPRUDENCE

This part of the article will discuss the Supreme Court's prior RICO
jurisprudence, focusing on five cases in which it has interpreted the statute.' 9 3 This jurisprudence indicates that neither the text of the statute
nor its legislative history support the restrictive manage or operate test.
A.

94
United States v. Turkette 1

Justice White, writing for the Court in Turkette, decided that RICO
covered both the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime
and completely illegitimate organizations. The defendant in Turkette argued that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and did not cover those
enterprises that perform only illegal acts and make no attempt to infiltrate legitimate businesses. 195
The opinion analyzes the statute by looking first at its language.
Early in the opinion, the Court hints at its views of the interplay between
that language and the legislative history. "If the statutory language is
unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclunental unqualified audit opinions at the time that examiners have claimed that Lincoln was
insolvent. Based on the firm's report that the company's financial condition was accurately
represented, American sold more than $200 million ofjunk bonds to over 23,000 investors. This sounds almost identical to what the plaintiffs in Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves are
alleging the company did. Following these sales, the Arthur Young partner who handled
Lincoln's account accepted a $930,000 position with Lincoln. Nathaniel C. Nash, Auditors
of Lincoln on the Spot, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 14, 1989, at D1, cited in RICO Myths, supra note 6, at
885 n.108. Similar collapses of Arthur Young clients have occurred in Texas. See Lee
Berton, Spotlight on Arthur Young is Likely to Intensify as Lincoln Hearings Resume, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 1989, at A20, cited in RICO Myths, supra, at 855. In fact, five of the top six accounting firms were banned from doing new work for savings and loans by the RTC because of
pending litigation for past faulty audits and dozens of impending civil suits. See RICO
Myths, supra note 6, at 894-95 n.137.
192. See Briefs of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amici Curiae,
HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); and Reves v. Ernst & Young, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).
193. In addition to the five cases discussed here, the Supreme Court has also construed
RICO in Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987); and Shearson Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The first four cases analyzed in the text
most clearly elucidate the Court's method of statutory interpretation. This Article includes
the final case, Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Co., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992), because
it is the Court's most recent interpretation of RICO.
194. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
195. Id. at 579-80.
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sive.' ,196 In other words, the Court will first examine the language, but
1 97
legislative history can trump even unambiguous statutory language.
In Turkette, the Court initially found that nothing in the language limits
enterprises to legitimate ones. 198 It considered the statutory language
unambiguous saying that "[t]he language of the statute, however-the
most reliable evidence of its intent-reveals that Congress opted for a
far broader definition of the word 'enterprise' " than the defendant
suggested. 19 9
The Court then examined the legislative history concluding that the
statement of findings and purpose is broad and that nothing in the legis2 00
It
lative history supports a narrow reading of the term enterprise.
rejected the view that the statute was only intended to reach the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. "This is not to gainsay
that the legislative history forcefully supports the view that the major
purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime."' 20 1 But none of these statements requires the negative inference that Title IX does not reach others. 20 2 The Court in
Turkette found unambiguous language and unambiguous legislative history. It ultimately discerned a clear Congressional intent in the legisla203
tive history that the terms of RICO be construed broadly.
B.

20 4
Russello v. United States

Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Russello, followed the
same approach to statutory interpretation as the Turkette Court. Justice
Blackmun quoted the language in Turkette that interpretation starts with
the statute's language, but clearly expressed legislative history can
trump unambiguous statutory language. 20 5 The Court stated that, if the
relevant term is not defined in the statute, this silence compels the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. 20 6 It then consulted the dictionary for a
definition of the words "interest and profit," which were at issue in Russello. The Court concluded that "Congress selected th[e] general term
["interest"] apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of
196. Id. at 580. See also Eskridge, supra, note 109, at 626-30. (Eskridge refers to this as
"soft plain meaning").
197. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), discussed in Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626.
198. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
199. Id. at 593.
200. Id. at 588-89.
201. Id. at 591.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 593.
204. 464 U.S. 16 (1983). In Russello, a person convicted under RICO for arson-related
offenses challenged the forfeiture of the insurance proceeds he received from his arson
activities. Defendant argued that the term "interest" in § 1963(a)(1) should be limited to
an interest in the enterprise, not profits or proceeds. The Court rejected this argument.
205. Id. at 20. See also Eskridge, supra note 109, at 626.
206. Russello, 464 U.S. at 21.
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the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth. '20 7
Among the terms of breadth in the statute to which the Court referred
are "enterprise" in § 1961(4), "racketeering" in § 1961(1) and "participate" in § 1962(c). 208 The Court decided Russello by considering the
language of the statute, looking first to the dictionary meaning of the
terms, then analyzing how the terms were used throughout the entire
statute.
The Court considered the legislative history in Russello but indicated
that it may be unnecessary to do so. It said "[i]f it is necessary to turn to
the legislative history... that history does not reveal.., a limited congressional intent." 20 9 As in Turkette, the Court discovered in RICO's
legislative history a broad scope since RICO was intended to provide
''new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized
'2 10
crime and its economic roots."
C.

2 11
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.

The Court in Sedima rejected a restrictive interpretation of
§ 1964(c) that would have required plaintiffs in a civil RICO action to
prove both that the defendant had already been convicted of a predicate
212
racketeering act of a RICO violation and a special racketeering injury.
Justice White, who wrote the Turkette opinion, also wrote the Sedima
opinion. The Court again looked first to the language of the statute,
then to the legislative history, concluding "the language of RICO gives
no obvious indication that a civil action can proceed only after a criminal
conviction." '213 It observed that when Congress intends, in other stat2 14
utes, for a defendant to have been previously convicted, it says so.
The Court also looked to neighboring subsections of the statute and
concluded that Congress would not have "intended the term to have
wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections." 215 As before,
the Court then analyzed the legislative history:
The history is otherwise silent on this point and contains nothing to contradict the import of the language appearing in the
statute. Had Congress intended to impose this novel requirement, there would have been at least some mention of it in the
21 6
legislative history, even if not in the statute.
The Court referred to the general principles in the legislative history
and concluded that a "less restrictive reading is amply supported by our
prior cases and the general principles surrounding this statute. RICO is
207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id at 26.
210. Id at 26 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) reprintedin 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
211. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
212. Id at 481.
213. Id at 488.
214. Id. at 489 n.7.
215. Id. at 489.
216. Id at 490.
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to be read broadly. This is the lesson.., of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach .... 217
Sedima also includes language which clearly shows that Congress intended RICO to combat white collar crime and that its language should
be broadly read to include those types of criminal defendants:
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the
'extraordinary, if not outrageous,' uses to which civil RICO has
been put. (citation ommitted). Instead of being used against
mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 'respected and legitimate
'enterprises." (citation ommitted). Yet Congress wanted to
reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises. (citation
ommitted). The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The
fact that [RICO] is used against respected businesses allegedly
engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct
is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is
being misconstrued. Nor does it reveal the 'ambiguity' discovered by the court below. '[T]he fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate218ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.' (citation ommitted).
D.

2 19
H.J.Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.

In H.J. Inc., Justice Brennan writing for the Court, looked first to
language and then to legislative history. The difference in H.J. Inc. is
that the Court found the language itself to be less clear than in the other
cases. H.. Inc. concerned what may be the most problematic term in the
entire statute: "pattern of racketeering activity." Once again, the Court
first consulted the dictionary, and upon finding it insufficient, considered how Congress used the term in analogous provisions within the
same act.2 20 It examined the legislative history and developed the definition of pattern as "continuity plus relationship" from the legislative
221
history of another provision within the act.
Moreover, in H.J. Inc., the Court explicitly rejected an organized
crime limitation on RICO, finding such a limitation is without support in
the text and contravenes the tenor of the legislative history.2 22 The
Court invoked the legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intentionally employed commodious language capable of reaching beyond
organized crime 2 23 by referring to comments made by opponents of
RICO, that criticized the statute for potentially extending beyond organ217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
in 1970
222.
223.

Id at 497-98.
Id. at 499.
492 U.S. 229 (1989).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 252 (relying on S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969)) (reprinted
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 246.
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ized crime. 2 24 The Court concluded with an allusion to the legislative
history: "[tlhe occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to
combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime
22 5
as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime."
Justice Scalia sharply criticized the majority's statutory analysis in
perhaps a concurring opinion. 2 26 He called the term "pattern of racketeering activity" "enigmatic." ' 22 7 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for
"[e]levating to the level of statutory text a phrase taken from the legislative history .... " 228 Again criticizing the majority for taking the definition from another provision in the same act and applying it to RICO, he
said:
[I]f normal (and sensible) rules of statutory construction were
followed, the existence of 3575(e) - which is the definition contained in another title of the Act which was explicitly not rendered applicable to RICO - suggests that whatever 'pattern'
might mean in RICO, it assuredly does not mean that. '[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generand purposely in
ally presumed that Congress acts 2intentionally
29
disparate inclusion or exclusion.'
Justice Scalia concluded by indicating that he would find the statute
230
vague if faced with that issue squarely.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 248.
226. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Justice Scalia in the
concurrence.
227. H.. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251.
228. Ia at 252.
229. Ia (emphasis in original) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23

(1983)).
230. Id. at 255. Accepting Justice Scalia's invitation, many litigants have raised this
issue in the circuits and, so far, no circuit has held the pattern element vague. See United
States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (Ist Cir.), cert. deniedby Granito v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
130 (1990); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.), cert. denied by Virgilio v.
United States, I I I S. Ct. 2009 (1990) (post-H.. Inc. cases rejecting vagueness challenges).
Prior to H.. Inc., the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits found RICO's pattern requirement constitutionally sound.
Moreover, in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989), the Supreme Court
upheld the Indiana RICO statute, which has the same pattern language, against a void for
vagueness challenge and observed:
[B]ecause the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited than the scope of
the State's obscenity.statute-with obscenity-related RICO prosecutions possible
only where one is guilty of a 'pattern' of obscenity violations-it would seem that
the RICO statute is inherently ess vague than any state obscenity law: a prosecution under the RICO law will be possible only where all the elements of an obscenity offense are present, and then some.
Id. at 58-59 n.7 (emphasis in original).
Professor G. Robert Blakey, the author of the RICO statute, has suggested that Fort
Wayne Books be read to settle the issue of the facial constitutionality of RICO type legislation. According to Professor Blakey, "RICO ... [does] not draw a line between criminal
and innocent conduct, [but] authorize(s) the imposition of different criminal or civil remedies on conduct already criminal when performed in a specific fashion." G. Robert Blakey,
Is "Pattern" Void For Vagueness?, supra note 6, at 6, 11, nn. 13, 72 Dec. 12, 1989. Moreover,
"No person seeking to keep his conduct within the law need fear RICO. All he must do is
not violate the predicate offenses." Id. at 7. Blakey, therefore, contends that RICO cannot
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Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.231

On March 24, 1992, the Supreme Court decided that § 1964(c), the
civil Rico provision, includes a proximate cause requirement. 23 2 This
means that the racketeering activity must proximately cause the injury
claimed. 23 3 The Court's straightforward analysis looked to the legislative history and found that § 1964(c) was modeled after Section Four of
the Clayton Act 2 3 4 which was based on Section Seven of the Sherman
Act. 2 35 Lower federal courts had read Section Seven to incorporate
common law principles of proximate causation. The Supreme Court
previously held that Congress' use of Section Seven language in Section
Four presumably showed the intention to adopt the judicial gloss on
Section Seven. 23 6 The Court said that this reasoning applies equally to
§ 1964(c). "[Congress] used the same words, and we can only assume it
intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given
23 7
them."
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor 2 38 agreed with the majority that § 1964(c) includes a proximate cause requirement. However,
be vague because a defendant is clearly apprised of the line between guilt and innocence.
"What the Constitution requires is that a defendant know to conform his conduct to the
law. Nothing else is required." Id
Professor Lynch has characterized the confusion over what the pattern requirement
means as bogus.
The notion that the concept of'pattern' is too vague to be understood by ajury of
English-speakers of ordinary intelligence can be credited only against the background ofjudicial efforts to twist a rather basic (if hard to define) concept into
elaborate knots in order to find patterns in criminal cases and find lack of pattern
in civil suits to which courts are hostile.
Lynch adds:
Far more than obscenity, a 'pattern' is something that we know when we see it; it
is the nature of our intelligence to group things into patterns based on perceived
relationships, while finding some things too random-too 'isolated and sporadic,'
if you will-to be so grouped. Asking jurors quite simply whether the facts fall
into a pattern or are just isolated and sporadic instances of crime strikes me as a
perfectly responsible course. Subdividing the fundamental notion of pattern into
rigid subtests of'relationship' and 'continuity' seems unnecessarily arcane, and it
is no wonder that the courts have wrought wonders of confusion by attempting a
technical definition of a readily understood lay term.
Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REv.
769, 772 n.8 (1990).
One commentator has suggested that nexus, like the pattern element, is also vague.
See Reed, supra note 6, at 722. Reed thinks that nexus is susceptible to a vagueness challenge for the following reasons: (1) It has generated imprecise judicial interpretations, (2)
it is not defined in the definitional section of RICO, and (3) 1962(c) itself does not specify
"the degree of interrelationship between the pattern of racketeering and the conduct of
the enterprise's affairs." IdL
231. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992) (Justice Souter wrote the opinion).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) states that: "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
233. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
234. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
235. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
236. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983).
237. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318.
238. Justices White and Stevens joined Justice O'Connor. Justice Scalia concurred separately with the opinion.
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these three justices and Justice Scalia would have reached the other issue presented in the case-whether a plaintiff must be a purchaser or a
seller of securities to bring a RICO claim predicated upon allegations of
fraud in the sale of securities. 23 9 The four justices would have found no
such limitation in the statute. Justice O'Connor's opinion considered
the text of the statute and found that § 1964, on its face, has no purchaser/seller standing requirement and sweeps broadly, using the words
" '[a]ny person' who is injured by reason of a RICO violation." 240 The
four concurring justices found that "any person" cannot reasonably be
read to mean only purchasers and sellers of securities. 24 1 Furthermore,
Justices O'Connor, White, and Stevens said that "[tlhere is 24
no2 room in
the statutory language for an additional ...
PART

A.

VI.

A

requirement.1

PROPOSAL FOR INTERPRETING

NExus

The Court's PriorRICO JurisprudenceShould Lead It to Reject the
Manage or Operate Test.

If the Supreme Court follows its past RICO jurisprudence, the
Court will apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation in Reves
v. Ernst & Young. 24 3 The Court will consider first the words of the statute and then, if the Court considers the language clear, it will analyze
the legislative history to support that finding. If the Court considers the
language ambiguous, the Court will examine the legislative history in an
attempt to discover the intent of Congress.
In its prior RICO opinions, the Court has found that Congress used
terms of breadth 244 in RICO; has interpreted the statute broadly in accordance with a general statutory plan employing such terms; and has
distilled from the legislative history a congressional intent that RICO be
broadly applied. The Court's language in Sedima is illustrative: "RICO
is to be read broadly. This is the lesson... of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach .... "245
The Court, in determining whether adoption of the manage or operate test is warranted, should first consider the language of the statute.
The Court, as it did in Turkette,246 Russello 24 7 and Sedima,2 48 should re-

ject the addition of language which does not appear in the statute. To
ascertain whether the text of the statute supports the manage or operate
239. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1322.
240. lid at 1323.
241. lId
242. Id.
243. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), cert. granted sub nom from, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
244. Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
245. Id. at 497-98.
246. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
247. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
248. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Moreover, four concurring justices in Holmes would have
reached the issue of whether one was required to be a buyer or seller of securities to bring
a RICO action based on a violation of securities laws and would have found as well that no
such limitation appears in the statute.
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test, the Court should consider the definition of the terms "conduct" or
"participate" in the dictionary, the structure of the entire RICO statute,
including how the same terms are used in other parts of the statute, and
how the same terms are construed in analogous provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act.
Application of these concepts should lead to rejection of the manage or operate test. First, the word conduct should not be restricted to
manage or operate. That reading ignores other equally valid definitions
which appear in the dictionary, such as "to carry on." The District of
Columbia Circuit Court's definition reads the statutory terms "conduct
or participate in the conduct of," too narrowly proceeding as if the statute simply said "conduct. ' 249 The restrictive definition in Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc. also ignores the word "participate" and the words "directly or
indirectly" which appear in § 1962(c). That these words appear with
conduct in § 1962(c) additionally undercuts limitation of the word conduct to manage, operate, or control.
Moreover, Congress' use of more restrictive language in other parts
of the statute indicates that it intentionally employed broad language in
§ 1962(c). The words "control or participate in the control of" appear
in § 1962(a), and § 1962(b) uses the term "control of any enterprise."
Congress presumably would have used equally restrictive terms in
§ 1962(c), had it so wished.
Analogous provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act, such as
18 U.S.C. §§ 1555 and 1511, and judicial interpretation of those provisions support a broad reading of conduct. Sections 1555 and 1511
which also use the word "conduct" have routinely been applied to individuals who did not "manage or operate" a gambling establishment. In
short, Supreme Court scrutiny of RICO's language should lend no support to the manage or operate test.
The Court, following its prior method, should find persuasive support for a broad reading of RICO's terms in its legislative history. It
should hold, as it has in earlier RICO cases, that RICO's legislative history evidences a broad scope. The Court should reject the manage or
operate test based upon the language of the statute, its structure and the
legislative history.
The Court may be influenced by the "new textualism" 2 50 of which
249. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883
F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reu'den banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2839 (1991).
250. This term was coined by William Eskridge, Jr.. See Eskridge, supra note 106, at 623
n. 11. Eskridge defines "new textualism" as:
once the court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history become irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted
to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text. Such confirmation comes, if
any is needed, from examination of the structure of the statute, interpretations
given similar statutory provisions, and canons of statutory construction.
Id. at 623-24. For additional critiques of "new textualism," see Sunstein, supra note 108;
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597
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Justice Antonin Scalia is the leading proponent. There is evidence that
his views on statutory construction are increasingly influencing the
Court's statutory construction. 2 5 1 Scalia favors a "hard plain meaning
rule," which ignores legislative history except in the rare instance when
2 52
the text is absurd on its face.
Justice White and Justice Scalia have sparred on the issue of statutory interpretation in other cases; most recently in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier.2 53 In Mortier,Justice White wrote the majority opinion,

joined by everyone on the Court except Justice Scalia. The majority
opinion relied heavily on the legislative history of the federal statute being construed. Justice Scalia wrote a scathing concurrence attacking the
majority's use of legislative history to reach its conclusion-a conclusion
25 4
which he agreed with based on his reading of the text alone.
A "new textualist" analysis of nexus would differ from traditional
statutory interpretation since it requires less consultation of legislative
history and relies on the language of the statute itself and the dictionary
definitions of the terms. Such an approach would examine other terms
within the same statute and then consider how the same terms are interpreted in other statutes. This procedure would differ minimally from
the Court's prior RICO analysis. A "new textualist" approach would

(1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward A
FactfindingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
251. These views have not, however, commanded a majority on the Court. Eskridge,
supra note 109, at 656. See also Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476
(1991).
252. Eskridge, supra note 109, at 651.
253. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
254. The concurrence elucidates Justice Scalia's "new textualist" approach:
Their [the majority's] only mistake was failing to recognize how unreliable Committee Reports are-not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent but as
a safe predictor ofjudicial construction. We use them when it is convenient, and
ignore them when it is not ....
All we know for sure is that the full Senate
adopted the text that we have before us here, as did the full House, pursuant to
the procedures prescribed by the Constitution; and that that text, having been
transmitted to the President and approved by him, again pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, became law. On the important question
before us today ....
we should try to give the text its fair meaning, whatever
various committees might have had to say-thereby affirming the proposition that
we are a Government of laws not of committee reports.
Id. at 2488, 2490.
Justice White, in the majority opinion, responds to Justice Scalia's criticism by stating:
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that
inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it. As
ChiefJustice Marshall put it, '[w]here the mind labors to discover the design of
the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived.' [citation omitted] Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists
should never employ them in a good faith effort to discern legislative intent. Our
precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history
reaches well into its past. [citation omitted] We suspect that the practice will
likewise reach well into' the future.
Id. at 2485 n.4.
Justice Scalia responded to Justice White's statement by observing:
I am depressed if the Court is predicting that the use of legislative history for the
purpose I have criticized 'will ... reach well into the future.' But if it is, and its
prediction of the future is as accurate as its perception that it is continuing a
'practice... reach[ing] well into [our] past,' I may have nothing to fear.
Id. at 2491.
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consult legislative history, however, only if the language of the statute
were not only ambiguous but ridiculous. 2 55 Even were the Court to apply Justice Scalia's "new textualist" approach, it should reject the manage or operate test. The test has no support in the particular language
being construed nor the structure of the statute itself.
B.

The Court Should Require That One "Manage, Operate, or Carry On the
Business of the Enterprise."

If the Court rejects the manage or operate test, how then should it
interpret this provision of the statute? I suggest an "ordinary meaning"
approach. 25 6 I propose that the Court construe "conduct or participate
in the conduct of an enterprise" to mean "manage, operate, or to take
part in the carrying on of the business of the enterprise." This construction conforms to the dictionary definition of the terms, and it is consistent with the structure of the statute which demonstrates that Congress
intended § 1962(c) to be construed more broadly than §§ 1962(a) or
(b). It is also consistent with the construction of the terms in analogous
provisions such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1511 and 1555 where conduct has been
interpreted to cover more than just those who manage or operate. This
construction is true as well to RICO's legislative history which indicates
that Congress intended to create a "new weapon of unprecedented
'2 57
scope for an assault on organized crime and its economic roots.
The test which I propose is preferable to other nexus tests that
courts currently employ. The Scotto-Provenzanotest 2 58 is too broad. This
test means that one can conduct the affairs of the enterprise simply if
one's position in the enterprise enables one to commit the racketeering
acts. The test also states that, if the racketeering acts are related to the
enterprise, one conducts or participates in the affairs of the enterprise.
It would include acts committed when one was not managing, operating
or carrying on the business of the enterprise. The Cauble test 259 is problematic because it requires that the racketeering activity affect the enterprise and that one's position within the enterprise facilitate the
commission of the acts. This requirement would exclude outsiders who
are associated with the enterprise. The facilitation test 260 is deficient
because using the facilities and services of an enterprise does not mean
that one is conducting or participating in the conduct of the enterprise.
The test which I have proposed includes outsiders as well as insiders but requires that one at least carry on the business of the enterprise.
255. See Eskridge, supra note 109, at 623 (quotingJustice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480,U.S. 421 (1987)).
256. Michael Goldsmith proposed such an approach to the issue of pattern in RICO and
"Pattern:" The Searchfor "Continuity Plus Relationship." Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 973.
257. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
4007.
258. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
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This is truer to congressional intent than tests which merely require relation or utilization.
Does this test apprise people of ordinary intelligence what conduct
is forbidden, and is it precise enough to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement by those applying the statute? 261 Criminal statutes must pass two tests not to be found vague. First, they must give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that she can conform her actions to the law. Second, criminal statutes must be precise enough to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement by those applying them. The notice requirement
does not impose on statutory language impossible requirements of specificity. Statutory language does not have to approach mathematical certainty and a court will not invalidate a statute for vagueness simply
2 62
because Congress could have drafted the law more precisely.
Words never stand by themselves. The significance of congressional enactments necessarily depends on context. 265 One, therefore,
looks not only to the words, but to their context. If one assumes that the
words "conduct or participate in the conduct of" mean manage, operate
or carry on, one must then determine what the phrase means within the
whole context of § 1962(c). 26 4 Second, the individual must manage, operate or carry on the business of the enterprise. Third, the person must
do this through a pattern of racketeering activity. It is not a crime to
manage, operate or carry on the business of an enterprise. One must go
through a pattern of racketeering activity. In other words, one must first
commit a crime.
The United States Supreme Court has already stated that the vagueness line is drawn in RICO at the commission of the predicate offense.
In Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana,265 the Court said, if the predicate offense
is not unconstitutionally vague, the RICO statute cannot be. The Court
observed:
[B]ecause the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited
than the scope of the State's obscenity statute-with obscenityrelated RICO prosecutions possible only where one is guilty of
a "pattern" of obscenity violations-it would seem that the
RICO statute is inherently less vague than any state obscenity
law;, a prosecution under the RICO law will be possible only
where all the elements of an obscenity offense are present, and
2 66
then some.
261. Reed, supra note 6, at 723; Bauerschmidt, supra note 6, at 1115; Gartenstein &
Warganz, supra note 6, at 512-17.
262. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); see also Blakey, Is "Pattern" Voidfor Vagueness?, supra note 6, at 6; Gartenstein & Warganz, supra note 6, at 514.
263. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 416; see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

217-27 (1975).

264. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) makes it illegal for "any person employed by or associated
with an enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt."
265. 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
266. Id. at 925 n.5.
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Professor G. Robert Blakey contends that RICO does not draw a
line between criminal and innocent conduct but authorizes additional
penalties for activity that is already criminal when performed in a specific fashion. 26 7 The purpose of notice is to give a person an opportunity to conform his or her actions to the law. A person should not have
the right to commit a predicate act yet still avoid RICO prosecution. 268
As Professor Blakey has stated, one does not get "two bites at the vagueness apple." 26 9 Even Reed, who argues most vociferously that RICO is
vague, concedes that any vagueness challenge to RICO must overcome
the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Wayne Books drawing the vagueness
27 0
line at the predicate act.
Assuming that there is no notice problem, it is my proposal that
"conduct or participate in the conduct of" be interpreted simply to
mean "manage, operate, or carry on the business of an enterprise."
This test is sufficiently broad to encompass acts which Congress intended the statute to cover and narrow enough to exclude conduct
which Congress intended not to include. Application of this proposal
can best be demonstrated by applying these definitions to the facts of
some of the leading RICO cases.
271
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc.

The union did not manage, operate or carry on the business of the
bus lines. The bus company was merely the target of the union's illegal
acts. The facts of Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., therefore, fail the test which I
have proposed.
United States v.

2 72

Dennis

The facts of Dennis would also fail to establish nexus under this construction. Dennis did not carry on the affairs of General Motors through
a pattern of racketeering activity. He simply participated in the activity
while on General Motors' premises.
2 73
United States v. Thomas

In the case of the Sheriff of Nashville, Tennessee, nexus would be
present not only for the Sheriff but also for the deputies who were
charged. The deputies who carried on the racketeering activity were
carrying on the affairs of the Sheriff's Department as well.
267. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 6, at 1031-33.
268. Garterstein & Wanganz, supra note 6, at 520 n.236.
269.

Blakey, CIVIL RICO REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.

270. Reed, supra note 6, at 727.
271. 883 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd en banc, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
272. 458 F. Supp 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978). See also text accompanying note 36.
273. 749 F. Supp 847 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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United States v. Webster

If one applies this construction of "conduct or participate in the
conduct of" to the facts of Webster, no nexus would be found. The defendant in Webster did not manage, operate, or carry on the affairs of the
restaurant through a pattern of racketeering activity. The restaurant

was merely the situs for some of the indicia of racketeering activity. Employees only forwarded calls regarding drugs from the restaurant to the
defendant's home. An employee provided free drinks to one of the defendant's drug customers. 2 75 The defendants were conducting the af-

fairs of their narcotics-selling organization through a pattern of
racketeering activity, but they were not conducting the affairs of their
restaurant through their drug selling activity.
2 76
United States v. Cauble

In contrast to Webster, the ranching business in Cauble was completely interwoven with the drug smuggling activity. All of the facilities
and assets of the enterprise were regularly put to the use of drug smuggling. Most importantly, the drug smuggling financed the enterprise
and kept the enterprise going. The defendants carried on the business
of the enterprise through the drug smuggling. A sufficient nexus, therefore, exists under the facts of Cauble.
277
United States v. Scotto

Scotto presents a difficult case. Anthony Scotto was president of an
International Longshoremen's Union local and accepted payoffs from
individuals representing waterfront employers of union labor. The reasons for those payoffs varied. Some were to secure Scotto's assistance in
"reducing fraudulent and exaggerated workmen's compensation claims
filed by Scotto's local." 278 Others were to garner his assistance in soliciting new business.
The question is did he carry on the business of the local through the
acceptance of those illegal payoffs? The answer is perhaps. Under the
test enunciated in Scotto, it was unnecessary for the court to decide this.
Using that test, one could easily determine that Scotto was enabled to
accept these payoffs by being president of the local. But this is not necessarily sufficient. If Scotto simply accepted the payoffs and did not operate, manage or carry on the business of the local based upon receiving
these payoffs, there would be no nexus. If he did, however, for example,
encourage union managers to file or not file fraudulent workers compensation claims because he received these payoffs, Scotto would be carrying on the business of the local through a pattern of racketeering
274. 639 F.2d 174 (1981), modified in part, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 935 (1982).
275. Webster II, 669 F.2d at 187.
276. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
277. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
278. Id. at 51.
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activity. The evidence would have to show not only that he received the
payoffs solely because he was president of the union but also that he
pursued some course of action within the local based upon receiving
those payoffs.
279
United States v. Yonan

What about outsiders under this test? In Yonan, a defense attorney
offered bribes to an Assistant State's Attorney to fix a case. 280 Did he
manage, operate, or carry on the affairs of the State's Attorney's office
through a pattern of racketeering activity? The answer is yes. He conducted business with the county attorney's office. The business of the
county attorney's office was to prosecute criminal cases in Chicago. The
defendant tried to affect that business, and he did business with the enterprise. Under the Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. test, the nexus in Yonan would
obviously have been insufficient. Yonan hardly exercised "control over
'28
the course of the enterprise's activities." '
282
Reves v. Ernst & Young

If all that the accountants did was prepare false financial statements,
they would not be carrying on the business of the enterprise. However,
they also met with the board of directors and with the shareholders and
gave false information at those meetings. Their interaction with the
general manager in this scheme to overvalue the assets of the co-operative would be critical to determining whether they carried on the business of the enterprise. If they worked with the general manager in this
overall scheme to overvalue assets and hide the liabilities that were incurred by the gasohol plant, they might very well have been participating in carrying on the business of the enterprise, even though they may
not have managed or operated it.
These examples illustrate that simply construing the terms in ways
that comport with their common everyday meaning is workable and realistic for courts. It does not broaden the terms so that they lose any
meaning.
CONCLUSION

Congress has steadfastly repelled vigorous attempts to eviscerate
RICO. The Supreme Court has, in the past, refused to impose limitations upon RICO which are unsupported by its text and legislative
history.
The Supreme Court should similarly reject the manage or operate
test in Reves v. Ernst & Young because RICO's language, structure, and
279. 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
280. Id. at 165.
281. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
282. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), cert. grantedsub nom. from, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,
937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
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legislative history do not support the test. The Court should construe
"conduct or participate in the conduct of" to mean "manage, operate,
or carry on the business of" the enterprise. This test honors the words
of RICO, and is consistent with the structure of the statute and is supported by the legislative history.
Such a test would not exclude those people such as lawyers or accountants who play significant roles in fraudulent activity, but who,
nonetheless, do not manage or operate the enterprise. Congress did
not intend to exclude this type of person from RICO's reach.

